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1. Introduction
In some utterances, some material does not seem to be explicitly expressed in
words, but nevertheless seems to be part of the literal content of the utterance rather
than an implicature. I will call material of this kind implicit content. The following
are some relevant examples from the literature.
(1) Everyone was sick.
(2) I haven’t eaten.
(3) It’s raining.
In the case of (1), we are supposed to have asked Stephen Neale how his dinner
party went last night (Neale 1990: 94–95) and received this as the reply. Obviously,
we do not take Neale to be saying that everyone in the world was sick; we interpret
him as saying that everyone who attended his dinner party was sick. How, then,
do we come to incorporate the property of attending Neale’s dinner party into the
proposition expressed, when it does not seem to be the denotation of any overt lex-
ical items in the utterance? In uttering (2), I might be asserting that I have not eaten
dinner today (Bach 1994: 135–136), even though I do not use any audible words
meaning ‘dinner’ or ‘today’. (I might thereby intend to create an implicature to the
effect that we should go to a restaurant.) And in saying (3), I might be claiming
that it is raining at 11.59pm on Halloween 2008 in Arkham, Massachusetts, even
though I do not appear to mention any place (Perry 1986, Stanley 2000, Recanati
2002, 2004, 2007, Mart´ ı 2006, Neale 2007).
I will be concentrating on two questions about implicit content. The ﬁrst is
the question of the level of representation at which implicit content ﬁrst makes its
presence felt. Are there unpronounced items in the syntax of the sentence uttered
whose semantic value is implicit content? If so, what are their syntactic properties?
Or does implicit content leave no trace, as it were, in the syntax but appear only in
conceptual representations or the language of thought?
Versions of this article have been given as talks at the University of Chicago Linguistics Depart-
ment colloquium series, the second Oxford-Paris Workshop in the Philosophy of Language (Oxford
University), and SALT 18 (University of Massachusetts, Amherst). I am grateful to the audiences
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implicit content. How does it combine with the content provided by the overt con-
stituents in the syntax? I will distinguish two approaches to this latter problem: the
global approach and the local approach. The global approach says that the content
derived from the overt constituents in the syntax is asserted to be true only of a
restricted spatiotemporal part of the world.1 The local approach says that implicit
content can be interwoven with the content provided by overt constituents in the
syntax: it could be the value of unpronounced variables in the syntax, as just men-
tioned, or it could be added to the language of thought constituents that indicate (or
are) the semantic values of items in the syntax.
The global approach is subject to what are widely considered to be insu-
perable objections (Westerst˚ ahl 1985, Soames 1986), and I will not consider it in
detail in this paper. I will, however, distinguish four variants of the local approach
(Section 2); these variants differ, among other things, on whether they claim that
the syntax is crucially relevant, as described in the ﬁrst question. Stanley (2000,
2002a) and Stanley and Szab´ o (2000) have put forward an argument known as the
argument from binding that they claim supports their variant of the local approach
over others; in Section 3, I try to show that the argument from binding does not do
the work that Stanley and Szab´ o want it to do. However, I then go on, in Section 4,
to present a variant of the argument from binding that constitutes evidence against
Stanley and Szab´ o’s position and against some other variants of the local approach.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The Local Approach
Four versions of the local approach are prominent in the literature. I will examine
them in turn.
2.1. The Syntactic Relation Variable Approach
The ﬁrst version is what we might call the syntactic relation variable approach. Ac-
cording to this theory, there are unpronounced variables in the syntactic structure of
the sentence. The content of these variables is established by whatever mechanism
ﬁxes the content of overt indexicals. Their positioning is in principle subject to syn-
tactic constraints. Theories of this kind have been advocated by von Fintel (1994),
Stanley (2000, 2002a,b), Stanley and Szab´ o (2000) and Mart´ ı (2003, 2006).
Here is an example of the syntactic relation variable approach. Suppose
that determiners can come with an unpronounced pair of a relation variable and an
individual variable (von Fintel 1994: 30–31). Determiners take this pair as their
ﬁrst argument and then take the overt nominal. In the case of (4), we would have a
1This isthe same as whatNeale (1990: 95) callsthe implicitapproach. However, I willnot talk in
termsofNeale’sdistinctionbetweenimplicitandexplicitapproaches, sinceitdoesnotaccommodate
some varieties of what I here call the local approach. See the extensive terminological remarks in
Neale 2004, and in particular his footnote 126 (2004: 159).
IMPLICIT CONTENT AND THE ARGUMENT FROM BINDING 285syntactic structure like that in (5).
(4) The table is covered with books.
(5) [[[the [R pro]] table] [is covered with books]]
In this example, we might imagine that pro, the individual variable, has as its value
a particular room, the one containing the table in question. Let a be a name for this
room. The relation variable R might be assigned a meaning equivalent to that of
in. In the semantics, the denotation of the deﬁnite article would take two arguments
and intersect them. On this occasion, they would be the property of being in a and
the property of being a table. So the deﬁnite description ends up meaning ‘the table
in a’.
Of course we could have arrived at a meaning like ‘in a’ just with a property
variable. Why do we need a combination of an individual variable and a relation
variable? The following sentence is a good reason why (von Fintel 1994: 31). (6)
seems to have the reading in (7). This means that we can use the apparatus we have
introduced as shown in the simpliﬁed syntactic structure (8).
(6) Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam.
(7) Only one class x was so bad that no student in x passed x’s exam.
(8) [only one class]  2[t2 was so bad that no R1 pro2 student passed the R3 pro2
exam]
I follow Heim and Kratzer 1998 in positing a  -operator in the syntax, below the
subject. The individual variable pro2 is bound by this operator, as is the trace t2;R 1
once again means ‘in’, and R3 will be assigned a value something like ‘of’, in the
sense of ‘belonging to’ or ‘associated with’. This will produce the attested meaning.
Stanley and Szab´ o (2000) propose a variant of von Fintel’s theory whereby
the silent variables appear on nouns rather than on determiners. So (9) would have
the syntactic structure in (10); (11) would have the simpliﬁed syntactic structure in
(12).
(9) The table is covered with books.
(10) [[the [table [R1 pro2]]] [is covered with books]]
(11) Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam.
(12) [only one class]  2[t2 was so bad that no student R1 pro2 passed the exam
R3 pro2]
When two syntactic constituents denoting properties appear as sisters, as in the
present examples, their semantic values will be intersected. Apart from the dif-
ference in placement of the variables, Stanley and Szab´ o’s theory works like von
Fintel’s.
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The second version of the local approach to implicit content can be called the prag-
matic enrichment approach (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 189). According to vari-
eties of this theory, the output of the semantics is an object in a conceptual system
or language of thought (Fodor 1975). Supplementation of this object occurs in the
language of thought to obtain the mental object that corresponds to (or is) the literal
content of the utterance. For example, suppose that John and Mary have guests,
John enters the house noisily and Mary says (13) to him.
(13) Everyone is asleep!
From the conceptual representation in (14), John (or some aspect of John’s inferen-
tial faculties) proceeds to (15).2
(14) EVERYONE IS ASLEEP
(15) EVERYONE WHO IS A GUEST OF MINE IS ASLEEP
The syntax, then, is not involved, in contrast to the syntactic relation variable ap-
proach. Theories along these lines have been advocated by Sperber and Wilson
(1986), Carston (1988, 2002), Recanati (1993) and Bach (1994, 2005).
Importantly, these theories do not generally incorporate any syntactic re-
strictions on where in a language of thought object this supplementation can take
place (using syntactic now to refer to the hypothesized syntactic qualities of the
language of thought—see Fodor 1975): Sperber and Wilson, for example, say that
this kind of enrichment “involves the application, not of special-purpose decoding
rules, but of general-purpose inference rules, which apply to any conceptually rep-
resented information” (1986: 176); they suggest only a pragmatic principle (their
principle of relevance) for arriving at appropriately disambiguated and enriched
propositional representations (1986: 184). Theories of this kind, then, are poten-
tially vulnerable in the following way: if a reading turns out to be unavailable for a
given sentence, they cannot avail themselves of syntactic constraints to explain its
absence, unlike the theories that belong to the syntactic relation variable approach;
and they will face real difﬁculty if the reading in question can be argued to be prag-
matically plausible. It is this vulnerability that I attempt to exploit in Section 4 of
this paper.
2.3. The Explicit Approach
The third version of the local approach is the “explicit approach” of Stephen Neale
(1990, 2004). Here is a description of it (Neale 2004: 121):
The basic idea is explicitly modal: the nominal is often shorthand for,
elliptical for, an abbreviation of at least one richer nominal the speaker
2I follow the usual convention of representing language of thought strings as English sentences
in capitals.
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the name.) Consider the following dialogue:
A: The table is scratched.
B: Which table?
A: The table I bought this morning. (Or: The one I bought this morn-
ing.)
According to the explicit approach, this type of dialogue is suggestive
of what is going on when we make felicitous uses of incomplete de-
scriptions. B is intended to interpret A’s utterance of ‘the table’ as if
it were an utterance of ‘the table I bought this morning’. There need
not be a unique description that A can supply, but there had better be
at least one—and one that B could reasonably have been expected to
construct at that—if the speech act is to be felicitous.
Neale (2004: 122, 167) is emphatic that the explicit approach does not involve
syntactic deletion of the kind seen in discussions of VP-ellipsis and NP-deletion in
syntactic theory. It is not the case, for example, that the relative clause I bought this
morningispresentinthesyntaxinA’sﬁrstutteranceabove, butjustnotpronounced.
Is there any difference, then, between Neale’s position and what I just re-
ferred to as the pragmatic enrichment approach? There is. According to the prag-
matic enrichment approach, we act directly on language of thought representations
without further reference to the syntax when we understand an utterance that in-
volves implicit content. Neale (2004: 82–83) is content to assume a language of
thought and to assume that understanding an utterance involves entertaining a par-
ticular language of thought representation. But according to Neale there is a limit
on the kind of enrichment of language of thought strings that is permitted: we have
to understand phrases involving implicit content as if they were phrases produced
by adding words to the phrases actually uttered (Neale 2004: 122).
This difference between Neale’s explicit approach and the pragmatic en-
richment approach makes Neale’s theory in a certain respect more constrained.
Enrichment in Neale’s theory can only yield meanings that could be obtained by
syntactically building on the material present in the syntax. No such constraint is
present in the pragmatic enrichment theory. As we will see, Neale will be in a
position to claim an advantage for his theory because of this aspect of it.
2.4. The Syntactic Situation Variable Approach
The fourth and ﬁnal version of the local approach that I will consider might be
called the syntactic situation variable approach. Kuroda (1982), Recanati (1996,
2004) and Kratzer (2004) have proposed that implicit content is provided by each
predicate being associated with a situation variable in the syntax, so that different
predicates in one sentence can be evaluated with respect to different parts of the
world (or even different parts of different possible worlds).
Detailed versions of the compositional semantics of systems like this have
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roughly on their ideas. A sentence like (16) would have an LF like (17).
(16) Every subject is asleep.
(17)  8 [[every [subject s8]] [is [asleep s8]]]
By means of a syncategorematic rule, the operator  8 is interpreted as a lambda op-
erator binding coindexed variables in its scope. A predicate like subject or asleep
will take a situation variable as its argument and return the characteristic function
of the set of individuals with the relevant property in the situation in question. (Al-
ternatively, depending on the details of the system being used, it might return an
intensionalized version of that characteristic function.) So the semantic value of
[asleep s8] might be something like [ x.x is asleep in s8], where s8 will end up be-
ing bound. (Note the difference between situation variables in the syntax, written
in upright type, and situation variables in the metalanguage, written in italics.) The
semantic value of the whole LF (17) will be something like (18).
(18)  s8.every subject in s8 is asleep in s8
UtterancesofpropositionalLFswilltypicallyexpressAustinianpropositions, which
are pairs of functions like (18) and topic situations that speakers are trying to say
something about. If the topic situation in an Austinian proposition is a member of
the set deﬁned by the lambda-term, the speaker has spoken truly.
In this initial example, all situation variables are bound by the   operator.
But at least some of the situation variables in a sentence, according to the current
theory, are capable of being referential. They can refer to particular spatiotemporal
parts of the world. Take Soames’s (1986) example (19).
(19) Everyone is asleep and is being monitored by a research assistant.
This would have a simpliﬁed LF something like the following:
(20)  8 [[every [-one s1]] [[is asleep s8] and [is being monitored s8 by a research
assistant s8]]]
The situation variable s1 would refer to a (possibly doughnut-shaped) part of the
world s1 that contained the experimental subjects and no-one else, while the vari-
ables s8 would be bound, as before, by the   operator. The semantic value of this
LF would be as follows:
(21)  s8.everyone in s1 is asleep in s8 and being monitored by a research assis-
tant in s8
3The system in Elbourne 2005, with its operator s0 (Elbourne 2005: 103), would also deal suc-
cessfully with the examples considered here.
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jects and the research assistant, the right results, it seems, will be obtained.
3. The Argument from Binding
Stanley (2000, 2002a,b) and Stanley and Szab´ o (2000) allege that the syntactic
relationvariableapproachissuperiortothepragmaticenrichmentapproachbecause
ofcaseswherethereseemstobeaboundvariableintheimplicitmaterial. Examples
are (22a) and (23a), which have the readings in (22b) and (23b) respectively.
(22) a. In every room in John’s house, every bottle is in the corner.
b. Every room x in John’s house is such that every bottle in x is in the
corner of x.
(23) a. Every student answered every question.
b. Every student x answered every question on x’s exam.
Stanley (2002a: 153) gives the following summary of the force that these data are
supposed to have:
One characteristic syntactic feature of pronouns is their capacity to be
bound by variable-binding operators. By demonstrating the existence
of bound readings of quantiﬁer-domain variables, one provides evi-
dence of behavior that is explicable on the assumption that there is an
unpronounced pronominal element, and difﬁcult to explain otherwise.
In itself, then, the argument from binding does not show that other theories, such as
the pragmatic enrichment approach, cannot handle the data in question. But Stanley
(2002a) attempts to show that the pragmatic enrichment approach, in particular,
cannot deal with the data in question without encountering serious problems. I will
now review these arguments.
Stanley (2002a) begins the relevant section of his paper by sketching a prag-
matic process that could in principle allow speakers to communicate propositions
with implicit content including bound variables, without corresponding bound vari-
ables occurring in the syntactic structure of the sentence uttered. Here is what he
says (Stanley 2002a: 160):
Suppose that interpreters, when they hear a sentence whose semantic
content in context is either less than fully propositional or expresses a
proposition that the speaker clearly does not intend to communicate,
quite automatically replace the uttered sentence by another one, one
that contains additional words. This more complicated sentence, rel-
ative to that context, would semantically express the proposition the
speaker intends to communicate, and the interpreter in fact grasps. But
the recovery of this more developed sentence, although often fairly au-
tomatic and almost always unconscious (or tacit), is still a pragmatic
process.
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though Stanley does not say this, it is seemingly indistinguishable from Neale’s
(1990, 2004) explicit approach, since it talks about the proposition obtained by
adding more words to the original sentence uttered; and two, it does not take ac-
countoftheresourcesthattheadvocatesofthepragmaticenrichmentapproachhave
at their disposal, since these latter can say that a bound variable is added at the rele-
vantplaceinalanguageofthoughtstringwithnoreferencetothesyntacticstructure
of the original sentence (Carston 2002: 198–200). We will want to distinguish care-
fully between points Stanley makes that affect only Neale’s explicit approach and
points he makes that are relevant for the pragmatic enrichment approach too.
Stanley’s ﬁrst criticism is relevant only to Neale’s explicit approach. Stanley
(2002a: 162) claims that on this theory it is mysterious why vacuous quantiﬁcation
causes ungrammaticality. Why, Stanley asks, should the following sentences be
ungrammatical?
(24) *Everyone who John ran, he likes.
(25) *Everyone has had the privilege of having John greet.
After all, if there was a process that allowed an interpreter to replace the uttered
sentence with a different one obtained by adding more lexical material, including
bound variables, an interpreter should be able to hear (24) and (25) and replace
them with the (26) and (27), respectively.
(26) Everyone who1 John ran by t1, he likes.
(27) Everyone has had the privilege of having John greet her.
Why should the new sentence not alleviate the ungrammaticality of the original one,
as well as providing it with a particular meaning?
To this criticism, I think we can very well answer “Why should it?” The
kind of process postulated by Neale and criticized by Stanley is one whose purpose
is to provide interpretations, not alleviations of ungrammaticality. Perhaps in judg-
ing the grammaticality of an utterance we judge what was uttered rather than our
pragmatically triggered modiﬁcation of it.
The next part of Stanley’s (2002a) criticism of pragmatic enrichment the-
ories is relevant both to Neale’s explicit approach and the pragmatic enrichment
theories themselves. Stanley (2002a: 164) points out that many ungrammatical
sentences are nevertheless interpretable. He claims that, even if the theories in
question do not predict (24) and (25) to be grammatical with the meanings of (26)
and (27), they do nevertheless predict them to be interpretable with the meanings of
(26) and (27). He maintains, however, that (24) and (25) are “well-nigh impossible
to interpret” (Stanley 2002a: 164), which would be mysterious on the hypotheses
under investigation.
I fear, however, that Stanley has not given (24) and (25) enough of a chance.
The standard examples of implicit content generally only have the readings they do
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we attempt to place (24) and (25) in a suitable context. (25), repeated here as (28),
seems to me to respond particularly well to this treatment:
(28) (John is a fantastically eminent and good-looking movie star. A speaker of
an object-drop language with an imperfect command of English sees him
greeting an adoring woman, leaving behind him a trail of further ﬂustered
and appreciative recipients of his salutations. Gesturing towards this group
of women, he says the following.) *Everyone has had the privilege of having
John greet.
In this context, it seems to me, we can perfectly well interpret (25) as having the
meaning of (27), “Everyone has had the privilege of having John greet her,” even
though it is obviously not grammatical. Imagine further a scenario in which John,
out jogging, stops and has animated and friendly conversations with several people
along his route. Our non-native speaker of English could, I think, gesture towards
this group and say (24) and be interpreted as meaning what would more naturally
be expressed by (26).
The ﬁnal part of Stanley’s (2002a) critique is a generalization of the last one.
Referring to the pragmatic enrichment approach, he says the following (Stanley
2002a: 164–165):
For if there were the sort of pragmatic processes postulated by the hy-
pothesis, then there are countless examples of sentences that speak-
ers should be able to use, without consciously and obviously ﬂouting
Gricean maxims, to communicate propositions that they in fact cannot
thereby communicate.
Stanley gives one further example. If the pragmatic processes in question existed,
he claims (2002a: 165), then speakers should be able to say (29) and communicate
a content that would be expressed more fully by either (30a) or (30b).
(29) Everyone likes Sally.
(30) a. Everyone likes Sally and himself.
b. Everyone1 likes Sally and his1 mother.
I agree that (29) cannot be used with the content of (30a) or (30b). But I still
see room for an advocate of the pragmatic enrichment approach to maneuver. A
possible generalization that would rule out this case is the following:
(31) Generalization
Whentheresultoftranslatingthesentenceutteredintoalanguageofthought
string is fully propositional, it is not possible in pragmatic enrichment to add
extra arguments to those contributed by items in the syntax.
292 Paul ElbourneI do not know of any counterexamples to this generalization. Typically, implicit
content, when it affects arguments of predicates at all, makes it clear who or what
an argument present in the syntax actually refers to or ranges over, as when we
understand everyone in (1) to be equivalent to everyone present at Neale’s dinner
party last night.
It might be objected that the principle just postulated on behalf of the prag-
matic enrichment approach is rather ad hoc. This is a fair comment. But presum-
ably the different varieties of the pragmatic enrichment approach would be able to
bring their various pragmatic theories to bear in order to try to derive this princi-
ple from deeper and more general ones. Bach, for example, says that when the
result of translating the sentence uttered into a language of thought string is fully
propositional, enrichment is “needed if the speaker cannot plausibly be supposed
to mean just what the sentence means” (Bach 1994: 139). One could strengthen
that to “possible if and only if the speaker cannot plausibly be supposed to mean
just what the sentence means” and then argue that every time one might plausibly
be supposed to mean what (30a) or (30b) means one might also plausibly be sup-
posed to mean what (29) means. I am not sure that this strategy in particular would
work, although I do not see why it should not. But I think it is clear by now that
Stanley has not produced a compelling argument against the pragmatic enrichment
approach. At worst, he has forced the advocates of this approach to start thinking
of ways to derive the plausible generalization in (31) from their pragmatic theories.
Overall, then, I do not think that Stanley and Szab´ o’s argument from binding
is very compelling.
4. A New Argument from Binding
In this section, I outline a new argument from binding. It shares certain charac-
teristics with Stanley and Szab´ o’s: in particular, it involves a sentence that lacks
a bound reading that the pragmatic enrichment approach would appear to predict
to be possible. But it also rules out certain other varieties of the local approach,
including Stanley and Szab´ o’s own.
As I have pointed out before in a slightly different context (Elbourne 2001b,
2005: 114), deﬁnite descriptions made with Saxon genitives (John’s hat, Mary’s
cat) do not seem to be able to be bound. Let us consider (32) ﬁrst, in order to be
clear about the reading in question. (32) has the reading in (33), among others.
(32) John fed no cat of Mary’s before it was bathed.
(33) There does not exist an individual x such that x is a cat of Mary’s and John
fed x before x was bathed.
In other words, no cat of Mary’s can bind it here. A truth-conditionally identical
reading is possible (for most speakers) when we substitute the deﬁnite description
the cat of Mary’s for it:
(34) John fed no cat of Mary’s before the cat of Mary’s was bathed.
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fed x before the cat of Mary’s identical to x was bathed.
But when we put Mary’s cat in the same place, the bound reading is not possible
for any speakers:
(36) John fed no cat of Mary’s before Mary’s cat was bathed.
(36) cannot have the reading in (35). We must see whether the theories we have
been examining can explain this fact.
Let us begin with the pragmatic enrichment approach. If it were possible
to add bound variables and other material freely in the language of thought, as this
approach contends, we would surely be able to convert the representation of cat in
Mary’s cat from CAT to CAT IDENTICAL TO x, passing from the representation in
(37) to the one in (38).
(37) NO CAT OF MARY’S x...MARY’S CAT WAS BATHED
(38) NO CAT OF MARY’S x...MARY’S CAT IDENTICAL TO x WAS BATHED
Indeed, if the pragmatic enrichment approach is to be used to handle incomplete
descriptions at all, its advocates will have to admit that CAT can be converted to CAT
IDENTICAL TO x, or something similar, in the case of (34); otherwise they would
not be able to analyze that example. But then they would seem to have no way to
prevent the same transformation occurring, contrary to fact, in the case of (36). As
mentioned above, the pragmatic enrichment approach cannot appeal to syntactic
considerations to rule out readings that must be disallowed. And the unavailable
reading of (36) does not involve new arguments being added to those provided in
the overt syntax, as was the case in (29) and (30); it involves something for which
thereisapreciseparallelin(34). Iconcludethatthepragmaticenrichmentapproach
overgenerates.
Let us turn to the syntactic relation variable approach. Can the syntactic
relation variable approach deal with the Saxon genitive data? It can, but only if
it is supposed that the silent variables are attached to determiners, as proposed by
von Fintel (1994) and others. Then we could suppose that, as a matter of idiosyn-
cratic subcategorization properties, the can host one and Mary’s cannot. The two
cases would look like this, where R is a relation variable and pro is an individual
variable:
(39) [DP [the [R pro]] [NP cat of Mary’s]]
(40) [DP Mary’s cat]
Thesyntacticrelationvariableapproachcanappealtoparticularsyntacticproperties
of the lexical items involved, unlike the pragmatic enrichment approach.
One might object at this point by pointing out that it is possible for deﬁnite
descriptions built from Saxon genitives to be improper, as we see in (41).
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knocked over.) Mary’s cat must have done that.
It might seem that the syntactic relation variable approach must, ex hypothesi, admit
that deﬁnite descriptions built from Saxon genitives can include a relation variable
and an individual variable in order to deal with this. But if they did, they could
surely be bound, contrary to what appears to be the case from (36).
There is an alternative analysis, however. Perhaps the deﬁnite determiner in
Mary’s cat already takes a relation variable and a lexical item of type e, but the item
of type e is Mary. In other words, the syntactic structure pronounced Mary’s cat
would be a conﬁguration like that in (42), where THE is a silent deﬁnite article:
(42) [DP [THE [R Mary]] [NP cat]]
So there would be no room for a bindable individual variable. In the case of (41),
R could mean something like “temporarily residing in this house and owned by.”
In other occurrences, R would take on other values, as suggested in work on the
semantics of the genitive by Barker (1995) and others.
A corollary of this reasoning is that Stanley and Szab´ o must be incorrect
when they say that their silent variables attach to NP in a structure [D NP]. Their
position, like the pragmatic enrichment approach, is unable to distinguish between
the cat of Mary’s and Mary’s cat. According to their theory, these phrases should
be able to receive syntactic representations like these:
(43) [DP the [NP [cat of Mary’s] [R pro]]]
(44) [DP Mary’s [NP cat [R pro]]]
These syntactic structures would of course result in both phrases being able to be
bound.
Since this difﬁculty for their theory has arisen, we should examine the ar-
guments in favor of placing the silent variables on NP that have been advanced by
Stanley and Szab´ o. Two arguments are to be found in their writings. The ﬁrst one
(Stanley and Szab´ o 2000: 257) involves the sentence in (45), which they claim has
the two readings in (46).
(45) Most people [GESTURE TOWARDS VILLAGE A] regularly scream. They are
crazy.
(46) a. “...The people in A are crazy.”
b. “...The people in A who regularly scream are crazy.”
Stanley and Szab´ o seem to assume that the deﬁnite description paraphrases in (46)
mean that we are dealing with a descriptive or D-type pronoun (Sommers 1982,
Neale 1990) and that, as is arguably necessary in such cases, the descriptive content
of they is to be obtained from the descriptive content of constituents in the linguistic
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pro] is attached to most in (45), there is no constituent there that has as its value the
set of people in the village. But if we have [people [R pro]], with pro referring to
A and R meaning “living in,” there is such a constituent. This would mean that the
pronoun they could look back to this constituent and pick up its descriptive content
from there, accounting for the reading in (46a).
The reading in (46b), Stanley and Szab´ o continue, can be derived on the
basis of the ﬁrst sentence of (45) from an independently motivated algorithm for
dealing with D-type pronouns devised by Stephen Neale (1990):
(47) If x is a pronoun that is anaphoric on, but not c-commanded by, a non-
maximal quantiﬁer ‘[Dx : Fx]’ that occurs in an antecedent clause ‘[Dx :
Fx](Gx)’, then x is interpreted as ‘[the x : Fx& Gx]’.
Applying this algorithm to the present case, and assuming that the variables are
adjoined to people, we get the following as a possible translation for the pronoun in
Neale’s semi-formal language:
(48) [the x : People-in-A(x) & Regularly-Scream(x)]
This does indeed represent the reading in (46b). So having the variables on the
nominal, not on the determiner, easily accounts for both available readings. Having
the variables on the determiner, Stanley and Szab´ o claim, would give no evident
way to obtain these readings.
It is possible to counter this argument, however. Even if we accept that they
in (45) must be a descriptive pronoun and that it must look to constituents of the
previous sentence in order to obtain its descriptive content, we have not seen an
argument that its descriptive content must be obtained only from there. In previous
work, I have argued that descriptive pronouns are deﬁnite articles followed by Noun
Phrases that have undergone phonological deletion (Elbourne 2001a, 2001b, 2005).
If that is correct, then the word they in (45) could be a determiner followed by an
unpronounced occurrence of people, elided on the basis of its occurrence in the
previous sentence. The determiner they, moreover, could take a pair of a relation
variable and an individual variable in the style of von Fintel (1994). So we would
have the conﬁguration in (49).
(49) [[they [R pro]] people]
The variables [R pro] would be free to pick up salient values freely, as is normally
the case, and would not be tied to assuming the values of constituents in the linguis-
tic environment. So pro could refer to village A and R could mean either “who live
in” or “who regularly scream and live in” as the case may be. Thus the two readings
in(46)wouldbeobtained. ThiscombinationofmaterialthatundergoesNP-deletion
and salient content picked up more freely has proven to be independently useful in
the analysis of donkey anaphora (Elbourne 2005: Chapter 4).
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variables must be placed on Noun Phrases. Stanley (2002b) argues that deﬁnite
descriptions involving nouns modiﬁed by superlative adjectives do not pick out the
right things unless the LF variable is on the head noun. He proposes the scenario
and example sentence in (50).
(50) (We are talking about Cornell students. The tallest person in the world is
not a Cornell student.) The tallest person is nice.
This occurrence of the tallest person, in context, can easily pick out the tallest
person among Cornell students. If the relevant variables are attached to person,
Stanley points out, it is easy to see how this might come about: we have a complex
[person [R pro]] that means “person who is a student at Cornell” and then tallest
combines with it and yields the singleton set containing the tallest person in the
set of Cornell students. But, Stanley says, if the variables had to appear on the they
would do no good: person would denote the set of all people in the world and tallest
would pick out the singleton set containing the tallest one of those; if the [R pro]
complex places a requirement on this person that he be a Cornell student, contrary
to fact, incoherence will result. So the variables had better go on person.
It appears, however, that Stanley is supposing that tallest operates as a unit:
it picks out the tallest entity from among the set denoted by its nominal sister and
gives us the singleton set containing this entity. But it has been proposed in the
literature on superlatives that -est is a separate operator that takes as arguments a
variable, the adjective and the noun (Heim 1999, Farkas and Kiss 2000, Herdan and
Sharvit 2006). Two possible structures for this are given in (51), where a simple set
variable C is used for simplicity instead of the combination [R pro]; (51b), advo-
catedbyHeim(1999), obviouslyrequiressomecovertmovementtotakeplace.
(51) a. [tall [-est C]] person
b. [-est C] [tall person]
If one of these is the structure we are dealing with, then obviously Stanley’s argu-
ment does not work. The noun person can still pick out the set of all the people
in the world, but then restriction to the set of Cornell students comes in with the
operator -est itself.
I conclude, then, that neither of Stanley and Szab´ o’s arguments in favor of
their placement of variables is valid, and that the data in (34) and (36) should make
us prefer von Fintel’s (1994) version of the syntactic relation variable approach.
LetusmoveonnowtoconsiderNeale’s(1990, 2004)explicitapproach. The
explicit approach can arguably deal with the data in (34) and (36). This approach,
recall, maintains that examples of the kind we have been looking at are short for
longer English sentences that could have been uttered. The sentences in question
have to be able to be constructed by adding lexical items to the material already
present in the syntax. Suppose now that Mary’s cat, by itself, does not contain
any bindable individual variable. Neale (personal communication) points out that
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that would bring about binding. What modiﬁers can be added to Noun Phrases to
produce anaphora? Precious few, and the ones that spring to mind (said, aforesaid,
in question, relative clauses containing bound variables) are not grammatical when
added to Mary’s cat, as we see in (52).4
(52) a. *Mary’s said cat
b. *Mary’s aforesaid cat
c. *Mary’s cat in question
d. *Mary’s cat that he was considering
By contrast, all of these modiﬁers can be grammatically added to the cat of Mary’s:
(53) a. the said cat of Mary’s
b. the aforesaid cat of Mary’s
c. the cat of Mary’s in question
d. the cat of Mary’s that he was considering
So Neale could assume that there is no bindable individual variable in the cat of
Mary’s either and account naturally for the contrast in (34) and (36). Alternatively,
he could assume that the (but, crucially, not Mary’s) regularly introduces a bind-
able individual variable as a matter of syntactic subcategorization (Elbourne 2001b,
2005; Neale 2004).
Let us now turn our attention to the syntactic situation variable approach.
We are in a position to make an argument here analogous to the one made about
the syntactic relation variable approach. Recall that the version of the syntactic sit-
uation variable approach currently advocated (Recanati 1996, 2004; Kratzer 2004)
maintains that each predicate comes paired with a situation variable. It could pos-
sibly explain the bound reading of (34) by saying that the situation variable paired
with cat (or cat of Mary’s) in that sentence is bound.5 But then its advocates would
seem to be forced to admit that there is nothing to stop the situation variable paired
with cat in (36) being bound either, even though this would produce a bound read-
ing of (36), contrary to fact.
This, of course, is a criticism precisely analogous to the one made of Stan-
ley and Szabo’s (2000) version of the syntactic relation variable approach, which
put the variables on the Noun Phrases. It is worth exploring for a moment the con-
sequences of making a move here analogous to the one I made in my discussion
of Stanley and Szabo (2000). I maintained that the facts in (34) and (36) should
4The inability of deﬁnite descriptions constructed from Saxon genitives to take post-nominal
modiﬁers, at least, was noted as far back as Chomsky 1986: 188.
5See Heim 1990, Percus 2000, Elbourne 2001a, 2005, and B¨ uring 2004 for extensive discussion
of binding situation variables.
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vidual variables on the determiners: the could host such a pair of variables, whereas
Mary’s could not. We should consider, then, the possibility of producing a variant
of the syntactic situation variable approach that makes syntactic situation variables
the arguments of determiners. Again, we could say that the hosts one and Mary’s
does not.
This will not do, however. Recall from example (41) that it is quite possible
for Mary’s cat and similar deﬁnite descriptions to be incomplete. The syntactic
situation variables approach must maintain, ex hypothesi, that such uses crucially
involve situation variables. But if we have a situation variable lurking somewhere
in Mary’s cat, and a system in place that allows binding of situation variables, we
seem to predict incorrectly that Mary’s cat will have a bound reading. The syntactic
situation variable approach faces a real difﬁculty here, then.
Before we conclude, let us consider a possibly novel approach, which I will
call the language of thought relation variable approach. According to this theory,
there are no covert variables in the syntax to do the job of providing implicit con-
tent, contra von Fintel (1994) and Stanley and Szab´ o (2000). Lexical items in the
syntaxare translatedintoobjects inthelanguageof thought, as supposedbySperber
and Wilson (1986). Some of these language of thought objects are complexes that
include variables that demand values to be assigned, as it were; at this level what
this would presumably boil down to would be a requirement that certain language
of thought objects be replaced by other, more contentful, ones. So a simplex lexical
item the might be translated into a language of thought complex THE R PRO, where
R PRO consists of a relation variable and an individual variable capable of being
replaced by IDENTICAL-TO x. But Mary’s and other Saxon genitives, as a matter of
their idiosyncratic meaning, would not be translated into language of thought ob-
jects of this kind. In other words, we take von Fintel’s (1994) theory and transpose
it into the language of thought. I cannot see any disadvantages to this theory at the
moment.
5. Conclusion
We started our investigation with the following theories on the table: the syntactic
relation variable approach in two versions (those of von Fintel 1994 and Stanley
and Szab´ o 2000), the pragmatic enrichment approach, the explicit approach, and
the syntactic situation variable approach. Add to these the late-arriving language
of thought relation variable approach just described. Examination of the binding
possibilities of Saxon genitives has proven to be quite informative. In particular,
the only theories that can deal straightforwardly with Mary’s cat seem to be the
syntactic relation variable approach in von Fintel’s version, the explicit approach,
and the language of thought relation variable approach. It will be interesting to see
if future work can distinguish between these latter theories.
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